If They Can Raze it, Why Can\u27t I? A Constitutional Analysis of Statutory and Judicial Religious Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances by Guiffre, Erin
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2007
If They Can Raze it, Why Can't I? A Constitutional
Analysis of Statutory and Judicial Religious
Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances
Erin Guiffre
Georgetown University Law Center
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hpps_papers/20
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hpps_papers
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Land Use Planning Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Religion Commons, and the
State and Local Government Law Commons
If They Can Raze it, Why Can’t I?  
A Constitutional Analysis of Statutory and Judicial Religious Exemptions to 
Historic Preservation Ordinances 
 
I.  Introduction 
In 1996, America almost lost a great piece of its history.  The Cathedral of Saint 
Vibiana, located in Los Angeles, was in danger of being destroyed.  The “Baroque-
inspired Italianate structure” was completed in 18761 by architect Ezra F. Kysor.2  The 
cathedral is one of only a few structures from Los Angeles’ early history remaining.3  As 
an important part of history and a beautiful piece of architecture, the cathedral was listed 
on California’s register of historic places.4  In 1994, an earthquake damaged part of the 
building.5  After an inspection by the building and safety department in 1996, the only 
portion of the cathedral found to be potentially structurally unsound was the bell tower.6  
The archdiocese began demolition of the cathedral anyway, without the demolition 
permits required by the building and safety department as a stipulation to an abatement 
order decreeing that the bell tower was an imminent danger.7  The archdiocese desired to 
                                                 
1 See 11 Most Endangered Places: Cathedral of St. Vibiana, National Trust for Historic Preservation 
(December 2003), available at http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133. 
2 Ezra Kysor is also known for designing the Pico House in Los Angeles.  The Pico House was the first 
three-story masonry building in Los Angeles and an upscale hotel.  See Dr. Matthew Cahn, Downtown Los 
Angeles Walking Tour (Spring 2000), available at http://www.csun.edu/~cahn/downtown1.html. 
3 See Cathedral of St. Vibiana, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (November 27, 2006) at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana. 
4 See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.   
To be listed on the California Register, a structure must either 1) be “[a]ssociated with events that have 
made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of local or regional history or the cultural heritage of 
California or the United States,” 2) be “[a]ssociated with the lives of persons important to local, California 
or national history,” 3) “[e]mbod[y] the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, region or method of 
construction or represent[] the work of a master or possess[] high artistic values,” or 4) [have] yielded, or 
ha[ve] the potential to yield, information important to the prehistory or history of the local area, California 
or the nation.”  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5024.1 (West 2004).      
5 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana. 
6 Id. 
7 See Maggie Garcia, Cardinal Mahony’s Other Cathedral: “Saved, But Degraded” The Rescue of St. 
Vibiana’s Cathedral, Los Angeles Lay Catholic Mission (December 2000). 
   
build a larger facility on the land.8  The archdiocese believed that the historic cathedral 
was outgrown and not worth repairing.9    As a result of the dire situation, the cathedral 
was listed as one of the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s 11 most endangered 
places in 1997.10  This listing sparked further concern from the preservationist 
community and they came to the rescue.  Because the cathedral was on California’s 
register of historic places, an environmental impact report had to be completed before the 
building could be razed.11  When the demolition was started before the church obtained 
permits, at the urging of preservationists, a judge issued a temporary restraining order to 
halt the demolition.12  The cathedral was saved when the wrecking crane was “literally 20 
feet away.”13  Because of the prevention of immediate demolition, the city and the 
archdiocese were able to enter into negotiations that resulted in the sale of the cathedral 
instead of its demolition.14  The cathedral is now used as a performing arts complex and 
library.15  Sadly, California has moved in the direction of not protecting historic religious 
properties.  Although state laws still apply, California now completely exempts religious 
institutions from local historic preservation ordinances.16  Historic structures located in 
other parts of the country are also in danger due to similar religious exemptions.17
 The harm caused by these exemptions is evident.  Historic preservation regulation 
is important to society.  “Structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural 
                                                 
8 See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133. 
9 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana. 
10 See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133. 




15 See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133. 
16 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 25373(d) (West 2002). 
17 See First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks 
Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990). 
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significance enhance the quality of life for all.”18  Preservation became a major concern 
in our nation in the mid-1960’s and the federal government began legislative endeavors 
to ensure the protection of historic properties.19  Today, in addition to federal legislation 
including the National Register of Historic Places, the National Historic Preservation 
Act,20 the National Environmental Policy Act,21 and Section 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act,22 all fifty states have preservation laws23 and state registers of 
historic places.24  There are also more than 2,000 local historic preservation ordinances.25  
The nation as a whole and by its parts is clearly concerned with keeping our history alive 
through regulating important historical structures. 
 Historic religious buildings are just as important to maintain as non-religious 
properties.  In fact, religious structures are made landmarks frequently “because of their 
stature, location, and architectural significance.”26  At the time of the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Saint Bartholomew’s, “of the six hundred landmarked sites, over fifteen 
percent [were] religious properties.”27  Religious properties help “define our history and 
identity” and are “historic and architectural focal points” in our communities.28  Our 
                                                 
18 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978). 
19 See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 
33 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1980-1981). 
20 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et. seq. (2000). 
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
22 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). 
23 Elizabeth Cameron Richardson,  Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church Property: 
Protecting the Past and Preserving the Constitution, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 404, 406 (January 1985). 
24 Sandra G. McLamb, Preservation Law Survey 2001: State Preservation Law, 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 463, 
471 (2002). 
25 McLamb at 474. 
26 Catherine Maxson, “Their Preservation is our Sacred Trust” – Judicially Mandated Free Exercise 
Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances Under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 
205, 214 (December 2003). 
27 Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. New York, 914 F.2d 348, 
354 (2d Cir. 1990).   
28 Laura S. Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark: Legal Protection for Historic Religious Properties 
in an Age of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 721, 725 (December 1999). 
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ability to recognize, remember and learn about history and its importance would be 
significantly reduced if buildings such as Old North Church in Boston where Paul 
Revere’s lanterns were hung were no longer around. 
While religious buildings are historically important, they are still religious.  
Historic preservation interests must be balanced with the competing important interest, 
and constitutional requirement, to not interfere with the free exercise of religion.  
Protecting religious freedom is a central tenant of our society.  The First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides in part, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”29  Some religious 
institutions have argued that applying historic preservation laws to religious structures 
impairs their free exercise of religion.30  Applying these ordinances to religious 
institutions has been said to restrict free exercise by allowing the government to have a 
say in religious matters and by not allowing religious institutions to use their property in 
the most financially beneficial way.31   
 Some jurisdictions have elected to alleviate any potential free exercise burdens by 
exempting religious institutions from the ordinances.  California’s Assembly Bill 133 
(AB 133) provides religious institutions with a blanket exemption from historic 
preservation.  It only requires that the institution object to the application of the ordinance 
to its property and determine in a public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship that 
will lessen economic return on the property or will affect the use of the property.32  There 
                                                 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
30 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d 348; First Covenant, 840 P.2d 174; Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d 
571.  
31 See First Covenant at 219. 
32 AB 133 provides, in relevant part: 
(b) The board may, by ordinance, provide special conditions or regulations for the protection, 
enhancement, perpetuation, or use of places, sites, buildings, structures, works of art and other 
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is also an exemption from historic preservation ordinances for religious institutions in 
Washington.  The Supreme Court of Washington created a judicial exemption by 
disagreeing with other courts and finding that the ordinances interfere with the free 
exercise of religion in violation of the United States Constitution and the Washington 
Constitution.33  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also created an exemption for 
religious institutions.  In Society of Jesus, the court found that interior designations of 
religious structures violated the Massachusetts Constitution.34     
 In this paper, I will demonstrate that complete exemptions of solely religious 
properties from historic preservation ordinances are unconstitutional.  Such exemptions 
are not only unnecessary for the preservation of religious freedom but also go as far as to 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.   
II.  Religious Free Exercise
 It has long been recognized that there is an "internal tension in the First 
Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause."35  On one 
hand, the Constitution requires that we protect religious freedom.  But, on the other hand, 
religious freedom cannot be so protected that the government is seen as preferring 
                                                                                                                                                 
objects having a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value. These special 
conditions and regulations may include appropriate and reasonable control of the appearance of 
neighboring private property within public view.
(d) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by any association or 
corporation that is religiously affiliated and not organized for private profit, whether the 
corporation is organized as a religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided 
that both of the following occur: 
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the subdivision to its property. 
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it will suffer substantial 
hardship, which is likely to deprive the association or corporation of economic return on its 
property, the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in the 
furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is approved.  § 25373(d). 
33 See First Covenant, 840 P.2d 174. 
34 See Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d 571. 
35 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971). 
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religion over non-religion.36  An exemption for religious institutions from legislation is 
sometimes constitutionally necessary to avoid infringing on their free exercise of religion.  
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 37 might also 
require a religious exemption even when not required by the Constitution.  However, if 
free exercise does not mandate an exemption, Establishment Clause concerns may be 
raised when religious institutions are exempted from generally applicable statutes.   
A.  The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
Exemptions for religious institutions from historic preservation ordinances are not 
mandated to protect free exercise under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA.  Under 
RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner 
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a 
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution--(A) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 




                                                 
36 See, e.g. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).  
37  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).   RLUIPA is a controversial statute.  This text reestablishes a strict scrutiny 
analysis to determine free exercise violations when land use regulations are involved.  However, the 
Supreme Court specifically rejected strict scrutiny as the test for free exercise violations unless certain 
exceptions are met.  See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990).  The Supreme Court even invalidated RLUIPA’s predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, holding that it was an unconstitutional use of Congress’ power.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997).  The Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA as applied to institutionalized persons in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).  Whether RLUIPA is constitutional with respect to land use regulations 
has not yet been determined. 
38 Id.  
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1.  Substantial Burden 
The first requirement for a law to be subject to RLUIPA is that the law impose a 
“substantial burden” upon free exercise.39  The phrase substantial burden is not defined in 
the Act, but the legislative history indicates that the determination of what constitutes a 
substantial burden should be based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent.40  In Supreme 
Court history, laws have been invalidated as substantial burdens on free exercise in only a 
few cases.41  Indeed, the Supreme Court found on numerous occasions that financial 
impacts on religious exercise are not substantial burdens.42  With little guidance from the 
Supreme Court, the circuits have developed several different tests for determining if a 
substantial burden exists.  These tests usually require coercion or a significant constraint 
on religious exercise.43   
In practice, historic preservation ordinances do not constitute substantial burdens 
on the free exercise of religious beliefs.  Historic preservation ordinances do not coerce 
or significantly inhibit religious exercise.  They do not restrict the religious use of historic 
properties, but rather restrict alterations and demolitions to the structure itself.  One can 
imagine a situation where this may significantly affect religious exercise.  For example, if 
                                                 
39 § 2000cc-1(a)(1). 
40 See 146 Cong. Rec. s7774-81 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy on 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000). 
41 See  Frazee v. Illinois Employment Security Dept., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment 
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963).  
42 See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 481 U.S. 1 (1988). 
43 See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
a substantial burden is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to 
conform his or her behavior accordingly”); Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 988 
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a substantial burden is “significantly inhibit[ing] or constrain[ing] conduct or 
expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual [religious] beliefs; must 
meaningfully curtail a [person’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] 
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a [person’s] religion”). 
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a community required a synagogue to keep a symbolic cross up on the exterior of the 
building because it was part of the original, historic, Catholic Church building.  The rare 
situations, like this example, where historic preservation ordinances interfere with 
religious exercise may be what proponents of religious exemptions are seeking to 
prevent.  However, almost any law could have a potential to interfere with religious 
exercise.  A potential for interference does not require a blanket exemption.44  Although 
historic preservation ordinances may seem to require such a result, there are no cases 
suggesting that they have been applied in such a manner.  In fact, no court has thus far 
found a substantial burden in the context of historic preservation laws.45   
2.  Religious Exercise 
RLUIPA also requires that the activity being substantially burdened is “religious 
exercise.”46  Although the act provides, “[t]his Act shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise,”47 the legislative history demonstrates that there is a limit 
to what is considered religious exercise:   
In many cases, real property is used by religious institutions for purposes 
that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions.  While 
recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or 
operated by a religious institution to obtain additional funds to further its 
religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these activities 
or facilities within the bill’s definition of “religious exercise.”  For 
example, a burden on a commercial building, which is connected to 
                                                 
44 The Supreme Court has rejected claims that statutes violate their free exercise rights in other far-fetched 
cases because of valid secular purposes and incidental effects on religion.  See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 
U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting claim that Native American’s should get exemption from requirement of 
providing social security numbers to receive food stamps because requiring Native American’s to obtain 
social security number for their two-year-old daughter was a violation of their Native American religious 
beliefs that widespread use of the number would rob the child of her spirit). 
45 Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA, SL014 ALI-ABA 719, 724 (2005).  But See 
Saints Constatine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 
2005) (holding that a land use case where the town denied a request to rezone property in a residential zone 
for a church was a substantial burden on free exercise where a series of legal errors cast doubt on the city’s 
good faith and created an inference of hostility towards religion). 
46 § 2000cc-1(a)(1). 
47 § 2000cc-3(g) 
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religious exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the 
building’s operation would be used to support religious exercise, is not a 
substantial burden on “religious exercise.”48
 
“[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise …”49    
 Historic preservation ordinances do not generally burden religious 
exercise.  “Most controversies involving historic preservation and religious 
organizations have little to do with the free exercise of religious beliefs …”50  
Rather, most controversies involve secular, financial considerations.51  The 
restrictions imposed by historic preservation ordinances on the use of historic 
religious property were just the sort of proscriptions that Senators Hatch and 
Kennedy expressly stated did not burden religious exercise.52  Land use 
ordinances that restrict the demolition of buildings for the purpose of constructing 
an office building or other commercial endeavor affect many property owners, not 
just religious institutions.  Therefore, these types of uses should not be considered 
to be religious exercise.   
3.  Compelling Governmental Interest 
Finally, RLUIPA requires that the government show a “compelling 
governmental interest” for a law covered by its proviosions to be valid.  Historic 
preservation is not likely to be considered a compelling governmental interest 
                                                 
48 146 Cong. Rec. at s7776. 
49 § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (emphasis added). 
50 Nelson at 729 (quoted by Justice Werdegar in his dissent in East Bay at 1151).   
51 See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 379 F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Episcopal 
Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Mich. 2004); First Church of Christ, 
Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm’n of the Town of Ridgefield, 738 A.2d 224 (Conn. Super Ct. 1998); Metro. 
Baptist Church v. District of Columbia Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 718 A.2d 119 (D.C. 
1998); St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d 348; Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 420 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1981). 
52 See  Supra at 7. 
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because it does not implicate health or safety concerns.53  The interest of 
preserving historic properties is not as vital as the interests involved in other cases 
where a compelling governmental interest has been found.54  Therefore, if 
RLUIPA is found to apply because there is a substantial burden on religious 
exercise, an historic preservation ordinance will almost certainly fail because the 
purposes of historic preservation are not compelling governmental interests. 
 Because historic preservation ordinances are not likely to impose 
substantial burdens and because the ordinances are not likely to affect religious 
exercise, it is unlikely that RLUIPA will apply in most cases.   
B.  Consitutional Free Exercise and Smith  
If RLUIPA does not apply to an historic preservation ordinance, or is 
found to be unconstitutional,55 the ordinance will be upheld if it is a neutral, 
generally applicable law.56   
1.  Neutral Laws of General Applicability 
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that denying unemployment benefits to 
two individuals who were fired after being convicted of peyote use was not an 
unconsitutional interference with free exercise because the drug laws were neutral 
laws of general applicability that only incidentally burdened religion.57  However, 
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah the Supreme Court 
found that laws agaist animal sacrifice were not neutral because the laws did not 
                                                 
53 Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA at 731. 
54 See Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (preventing discrimination is a compelling 
governmental interest);  Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 300 
(1981) (providing healthcare to the public is a compelling governmental interest). 
55 See Supra note 37. 
56 See Smith at 885. 
57 Id. 
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also apply to types of nonreligious animal killing that raised the same concerns as 
animal sacrifice.58  Rather, the court found that the laws “had as their object the 
suppression of religion.”59
 Historic preservation ordinances are neutral laws of general applicability 
that only burden religion incidentally, if at all.  Historic preservation ordinances 
do not target religion like the laws in Lukumi Babalu Aye.  The ordinances use 
secular criteria to determine when historic ordinances apply to a building and to 
determine whether to allow alterations or demolitions.  The same criteria are used 
whether the structure is religious or secular.  It is true that many religious 
structures are incidentally affected by historic preservation ordinances because the 
buildings are often historically and architecturally significant.60  But it is 
important to recognize that they are not targeted like the city targeted religious 
practices in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, but are only incidentally affected 
because of their historic value.  One clergymen said: 
All cathedrals are not equal.  Some cross the line, as it were, becoming not 
only a religious landmark but a kind of civic tapestry in which the strands 
of urban and even national history come together in a weave of great 
complexity, reminding an entire people both who they have been and who 
they might be.61
 
In fact, courts have specifically found that historic preservation ordinances are 
neutral laws of general applicability.62  In Saint Bartholomew’s, the Second 
Circuit held that, absent discriminatory motives, a landmark law did not violate 
                                                 
58 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
59 Id. at 542. 
60 Nelson at 737. 
61 Felipe M. Nunez & Eric Sidman, California’s Statutory Exemption for Religious Properties from 
Landmark Ordinances: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis, 12 J.L. & Religion 271, 322 (1995-1996). 
62 See, e.g.,  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997); City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian 
Church of Ypsilanti, 586 N.W.2d 87 (Mich. 1998).  But See First Covenant at 215. 
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free exercise rights when applied to a church because it was a “valid, neutral 
regulation of general applicability.”63
2.  Exceptions to the Smith Rule 
 There are some exceptions where even generally applicable laws may 
violate free exercise rights.64  In Smith, the Supreme Court implied that there may 
be exceptions to the generally applicable law standard in “hybrid” situations 
(where more than one constitutional right is at stake) or where the statute requires 
individual assesments that could render the law unneutral.65  Historic preservation 
ordinances do not fit under either exception.  Generally, only free exercise rights 
are truly at stake.66  There is rarely another valid constitutional claim involved.  
These ordinances also do not involve individual assessments that could render the 
law unneutral.  The elements of historic preservation ordinances are not subjective 
and decisions made using those elements are not arbitrary.67  The ordinances are 
“narrow in focus, and are governed by specific criteria that substantially constrain 
the discretion of the agency.”68
 Historic preservation ordinances are not invalid as burdens upon free 
exercise under either RLUIPA or the First Amendment.  Therefore, religious 
                                                 
63 St. Bartholomew’s at 355.  
64 Smith at 882-83. 
65 Id. 
66 But See First Covenant at 182. It has been argued that free speech rights are also implicated because 
religious architecture is a form of speech. See generally  Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and 
Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 Vill. L. 
Rev. 401 (April 1991).  It is also plausible that historic preservation ordinances might fit the hybrid rights 
exception because takings claims are implicated.  See generally Penn Central at 119.  However, in Penn 
Central, the court made clear that it is not easy to make a valid takings claim with respect to land use 
regulations.  See id. at 130-37.     
67Id. at 132-33.  
68 Nelson at 743. 
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exemptions to historic preservation ordinances are not mandated statutorily or 
constitutionally.  
III. Establishment of Religion  
 Because religious exemptions are clearly not mandated by free exercise 
rights, providing blanket exemptions for religious institutions from historic 
preservation ordinances is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  Despite this, a few states, either judicially or statutorily, have 
provided religious institutions with such exemptions.   
A.  California’s Assembly Bill 133 
Califiornia has what is basically a blanket religious exemption to local 
historic preservation ordinances in AB 133.69  The bill allows religious 
institutions to exempt themselves from local historic preservation ordinances70 as 
long as they object to the application of the ordinance to their institution and 
determine in a public forum that they “will suffer substantial hardship, which is 
likely to deprive the association or corporation of economic return on its property, 
the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in the 
furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is approved.”71  AB 133’s 
religious exemption from generally applicable historic preservation ordinances is 
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause.   
 
                                                 
69 § 25373(d) supra note 32. 
70 The exemption does not apply to state historic preservation laws as it is contained in the enabling statute 
for local legislatures.  See § 25373(d).  Therefore, religious organizations are still required to prepare 
environmental impact reports under the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. § 21000 et. 
seq. (2000). 
71 § 25373(d).  Glendale, California goes even further by not only exempting churches from historic 
preservation ordinances, but also allowing them to be removed from the historic register.  As opposed to 
AB 133, this ordinance applies retroactively.  Glendale, Cal., Ordinance 5110 (March 5, 1996). 
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1.  The Lemon Test 
The generally accepted test for determining if an Establishment Clause 
violation has occurred was set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.72  For a law to be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge it 
must a) have a secular purpose, b) must not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion, and c) must not impermissibly entangle church and state.73  
Using the Lemon test, in East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 
the Supreme Court of California found that AB 133 did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.74  The court found that the law a) had the valid secular 
purpose of preventing potential interference with free exercise,75 b) did not 
impermissibly advance religion because it merely allowed religious institutions to 
continue to use their property as they see fit,76 and c) did not foster excessive 
entanglement because the state was not involved with the religious institutions 
decision to exempt itself.77  I believe that the East Bay court was incorrect in its 
analysis and that AB 133 does violate the Establishment Clause. 
a.  Secular Purpose 
California’s religious exemption from historic preservation ordinances 
likely satisfies the first element of the Lemon test; it has a secular purpose.  The 
exemption is designed to protect religious free exercise.  The stated purpose of 
California’s AB 133 is to “ensure the protection of religious freedom” that is 
                                                 
72 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
73 Id.  
74 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000). 
75 Id. at 1134. 
76 Id. at 1136. 
77 Id. at 1137. 
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guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions.78    The Supreme 
Court has considered the accommodation of religious activity to be a valid secular 
purpose.  In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Supreme Court found that “it is a permissible 
legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions.”79  In that case, the church terminated an employee of its nonprofit 
gymnasium when he failed to qualify for a temple recommend.80  The church was 
able to fire an employee based on his religious affiliation because religious 
organizations are exempt from Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in 
employment on the basis of religion by Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.81 The Court held that this exemption was not an unconsitutional 
establishment of religion because allievation of a significant burden on religion 
was a valid secular purpose and because the exemption did not advance religion, 
rather it merely allowed religious organizations to advance their own religion.82  
In addition, in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, the Supreme Court held 
that removing a burden from free exercise by exempting a class of non-profit 
organizations that included religious organizations was a valid secular purpose.83  
However, the Court emphasized that the fact that the statute exempted a broad 
class of non-profit institutions rather than solely religious ones was an important 
                                                 
78 § 25373. 
79 483 U.S. 327, 335  (1987). 
80 Id. at 330. 
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2002). 
82 Amos at 337. 
83 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).  
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factor in their decision.84  The Supreme Court of California also found that the 
mere potential to interfere with free exercise was enough for religious 
accommodation to be a valid secular purpose.85  Further support can be found for 
the position that accommodation of religious exercise is a permissible secular 
legislative purpose in the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.  There, the court left 
it up to the political process and the legislatures to grant religious exemptions 
from laws that might interfere with religious exercise.86   
However, even considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Amos,  the 
exemption may be still at risk under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test 
because it sweeps more broadly than what is necessary to protect free exercise 
rights.  Because historic preservation ordinances do not impermissably burden the 
free exercise rights of the religious institutions to which they apply, accomodating 
religion through exemptions to the ordinances is not necessary.  In Justice 
Werdegar’s dissent in East Bay, she argued that overbroad religious exemptions 
violate the Establishment Clause, saying “‘accommodation’ justifies exemptions 
targeted to religious organizations only when the law from which an exemption is 
made would otherwise interfere significantly with some religious activity.”87  
However, the Supreme Court seems to have made clear that “the limits of 
permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with 
the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.”88  The purpose of the 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 East Bay at 1134. 
86 See Smith at 890. 
87 East Bay. at 1147 (Justice Werdegar dissenting).  For a similar argument, see Nelson at 763 (“Historic 
preservation regulation generally does not result in a burden on religious exercise. Thus, accommodation is 
neither necessary nor constitutionally acceptable.”).  
88 Walz at 673. 
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California religious exemption is to avoid what has been perceived as significant 
governmental interference into religious beliefs.  Under Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, even if not required by the Free Exercise Clause, this type of 
accommodation is a permissible secular purpose under the Lemon analysis. 
b. The Primary Effect of Advancing Religion 
However, California’s religious exemption from historic preservation 
ordinances fails the second prong of the Lemon analysis.  The exemption has the 
primary effect of advancing religion.  AB 133 allows only religious institutions to 
exempt any non-commercial property from historic preservation ordinances by 
simply declaring that it will suffer substantial hardship that is likely to deprive the 
association of economic return on the property, reasonable use of the property, or 
appropriate use of the property in the furtherance of its religious mission.89   
In Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court held that a sales tax exemption 
exclusively for religious periodicals had the primary effect of advancing religion 
because it was essentially a subsidy that forced non-religious taxpayers to support 
religious institutions.90  The court specifically focused on the fact that the 
exemption was granted solely for religious institutions, saying, with respect to 
other cases where religious accommodations were upheld: 
[i]n all of those cases, however, we emphasized that the benefits derived 
by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups 
as well.  Indeed were those benefits confined to religious organzations, 
they could not have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if 
that were so, we would not have hesitated to strike them down for lacking 
a secular purpose and effect.91
 
                                                 
89 § 25373(d). 
90 Texas Monthly at 15. 
91 Id. at 10-11. 
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 Although the exemption here is not a tax exemption, it still has the affect 
of advancing religion over nonreligion.  As Professor Weinstein so strongly put it: 
Exempting religious institutions from landmark designation creates the 
potential for significantly advancing religious ideas over competing 
secular ideas.  If St. Bart’s is free to reap millions of dollars from the 
commercial development of its property and then apply those funds to 
support its religious and charitable programs, but secular charitable 
institutions must comply with the landmark ordinance and so are denied 
access to funds derived from property development, then religious 
institutions and their ideas are given a significant advantage by 
government action.  Denying government the right to prefer religion over 
secularism lies at the core of the Lemon test …92
 
 The Supreme Court of California thought differently.  In East Bay, the 
court specifically found that the California exemption does not advance religion.93  
The court held that the exemption merely allows a religious institution to use its 
property “as it sees fit.”94  The court noted that the exemption does not shift any 
financial burdens from the religious property owners to secular property owners 
and thus is not a “subsidy” like the tax exemption in Texas Monthly.95   
Despite contrary arguments, California’s religious exemption does have 
the primary effect of advancing religion.  Just as the tax exemption in Texas 
Monthly, California’s exemption suffers a critical flaw in exempting only 
religious institutions and not including other nonprofit associations.  By giving 
religious institutions the ability to use their property in a way that is more 
economically beneficial than secular property owners may, the exemption gives 
                                                 
92 Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry v. Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Landmark 
Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 Temple L. Rev. 91, 157 (1992).  For similar arguments, see, e.g., 
East Bay at 1143 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Madeleine Randal, Holy War: In the Name of Religious Freedom, 
California Exempts Churches from Historic Preservation, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 213, 240 (1996); William 
P. Marshall and Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations under the Establishment 
Clause, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 293, 329 (1986). 
93 East Bay at 1135. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1136.   
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“added advantages of economic leverage in the secular realm” and goes “beyond 
reasonable accommodation.”96  It may be true that “if one is an owner of non-
religious property subject to a landmark ordinance that entails real economic costs 
to him, those economic costs are, in almost all cases, no different if the church 
down the street is landmarked or not.”97  However, I think this argument misses 
the point.  Although secular property owners might not have to directly pick up 
the bill like in Texas Monthly, they are still at a significant financial disadvantage.  
The exemption allows religious institutions to have more resources to carry out 
their religious mission than non-religious institutions have to carry out their 
secular missions; relgious property owners are given a financial advantage.  This 
clearly “advances” religion and thus fails the second prong of the Lemon test.  
c. Excessive Entanglement 
The exemption also fails the third prong of the Lemon analysis by causing 
excessive entanglement of church and state by granting governmental power to religious 
organizations.  The Lemon test prohibits not only government interference into religion 
but also religious organization’s interference with government affairs.98  In Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a statute allowing religious and 
educational institutions to prevent businesses within a 500-foot radius from obtaining a 
liquor license, stating that “substitut[ing] the unilateral and absolute power of a church 
for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body” excessively entangles 
                                                 
96 Amos at 343. 
97 Nunez at 305. 
98 Lemon at 614 (“the objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either the state or religious 
institutions into the precincts of the other”). 
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church and state.99  In fact, the court said “few entanglements could be more offensive to 
the spirit of the Constitution.”100  The East Bay dissenters found that California’s 
exemption excessively entangles church and state in the same way as did the law at issue 
in Larkin.  Justice Werdegar found that the exemption created a “forbidden ‘fusion of 
governmental and religious functions.’”101  Justice Mosk stated that the exemption: 
delegate[s] to religious organizations – and religious organizations only – the 
power to determine their own eligibility for an exemption from historic landmark 
preservation laws, with no requirement of review by a neutral governmental 
arbiter … creating a danger of ‘[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on 
religious lines.’102
 
In fact, the exemption at issue here seems to entwine the functions of church and 
state even more so than the statute in Larkin.  That statute allowed both religious 
institutions and schools to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses.  California’s 
exemption, on the other hand, allows only religious institutions to exempt 
themselves from historic preservation ordinances. 
However, it is also argued that the exemption avoids excessive 
entanglement by preventing the government from inquiring into religious  
matters. For example, the Supreme Court, in Amos, held that the law exempting 
religious institutions from Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act did not excessively 
entangle church and state because “the statute effectuates a more complete 
separation” by avoiding “instrusive inquir[ies] into religious belief.”103  Religious 
exemptions from historic preservation ordinances are different; they do not 
                                                 
99 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). 
100 Id. 
101 East Bay at 1156 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (quoting Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994)).
102 Id. at 1143 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Larkin at 127). 
103 Amos at 339. 
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require governmental intrusion.  Determining whether a religious institution must 
employ a certain individual or if doing so would violate their free exercise rights 
is clearly more intrusive than determining whether preventing alterations and 
demolitions to a structure would do the same.  “Real estate decisions do not 
implicate religious beliefs or practices remotely comparable to the personal 
relationships involved in hiring decisions.”104  Rather they are more akin to 
examining financial hardship, which is not an excessive entanglement.105
 Because delegating governmental power to religious institutions by 
allowing them to exempt themselves from historic preservation ordinances 
constitutes excessive entanglement, California’s religious exemption fails the 
excessive entanglement portion of the Lemon test.  It expressly allows religious 
institutions to determine if they meet exemption criteria.106  
 Under Lemon, AB 133 is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment because it has the primary effect of advancing religion and 
because it fosters excessive entanglement between church and state.  However, 
the Lemon test has come under fire107 and two alternative tests have also been 
used to determine if a law violates the Establishment Clause.  Justice O’Connor 
developed what has become known as the endorsement test for establishment 
clause violations.  Under her test, an establishment clause violation exists when an 
                                                 
104 Nelson at 767. 
105 See St. Bartholomew’s at 963. 
106 See § 25373(d)(2). 
107 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-640 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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objective, reasonable observer would find that the statute endorses religion.108  An 
objective observer is one who is “acquainted with the text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute.”109  In addition, Justice Kennedy has developed the 
coercion test for Establishment Clause analysis.  Under his coercion test, the 
Establishment Clause is violated when people are coerced into religious 
practice.110  California’s religious exemption also fails these two alternative tests. 
2.  The Endorsement Test 
An objective observer would see California’s religious exemption to 
historic preservation ordinances as an endorsement of religion.  In her East Bay 
dissent, Justice Werdegar analyzed California’s exemption using Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test.  She found that: 
[a]n objective observer familiar with the text, history, and social context of 
the self-exemption power granted in sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) 
would thus perceive it not as a reasonable attempt to prevent local 
government interference in religious affairs or to lift a significant burden 
on religious liberty, but as the unjustifiably broad award, to religiously 
affiliated property owners, of a unique and valuable privilege – the 
privilege of determining their own properties’ subjection to generally 
applicable land use laws.111
   
Justice Werdegar found that unless the exemption was justified by a need to prevent 
interference with religious exercise, an objective observer “must” see the exemption as an 
endorsement of religious enterprises.  However, the majority in East Bay felt that the 
exemption would not be seen as governmental endorsement of religion because it does 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., County of Allegheny at 625-26 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
109 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005). 
110 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992);  County of Allegheny at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
111 East Bay at 1156 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
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“no more than permit the use of the property as it was before landmark designation.”112 
Similarly, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Amos, found that an objective 
observer would perceive the exemption of religious institutions from Section 702 of the 
Civil Rights Act in allowing religious institutions to base employment decisions on 
religious affiliation as an accommodation of religious free exercise.113  Thus, sometimes, 
religious exemptions will overcome the endorsement test. 
I agree with Justice Werdegar’s analysis.  A reasonable, objective observer 
familiar with the exemption is not likely to think that allowing a religious institution to 
demolish an important historic structure in order to build an office building to raise 
revenue is solely an attempt to protect religious exercise.  Rather, the objective observer 
is likely to see the exemption as an endorsement of religion by giving preferential 
treatment to a religious institution because of only a small potential of interference with 
religious exercise.  If the observer is familiar with the exemption and the history behind 
it, they will recognize that the possibility that an historic preservation ordinance will truly 
interfere with religious exercise is slim.  These exemptions are unlike the exemption in 
Amos where employment decisions were at stake.  An objective observer is likely to view 
religious exemptions from employment discrimination statutes as accommodation.  The 
observer will recognize that the church’s non-profit endeavors on which the employees 
work are likely to be related to the religious mission.  This is a different situation than 
real estate decisions.  It is unlikely that most alterations or demolitions to buildings will 
affect a religious institutions ability to carry on its religious mission and one can expect 
that an objective observer would see this. 
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113 Amos at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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3.  The Coercion Test 
If Justice Kennedy’s coercion test is used to analyze the exemption, it may still be 
found to be an Establishment Clause violation, although the case is less strong than under 
the Lemon test or the endorsement test.  In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court found that 
school sponsored prayer at graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause 
because the students were coerced into at least participating or being respectful during the 
prayer.114  By giving religious property owners financial advantages over nonreligious 
property owners, we have seen that the exemption has the effect of advancing religion.  
In the same way, the exemption is coercing religion.  Nonreligious property owners may 
feel that they should or perhaps must become religiously affiliated in order to receive 
such great financial benefits.  Or maybe, the exemptions will force nonreligious property 
owners to only sell their property to religious institutions so that they do not suffer a loss 
in value upon resale.  However, it is a hard stretch to try to fit the advancement of 
religion through an exemption into a coercion test analysis.  I think it is more likely that 
either the Lemon test or the endorsement test would be used to analyze whether religious 
exemptions from historic preservation ordinances violate the Establishment Clause. 
B.  Washington’s Judicial Exemption 
Washington State also exempts religious institutions from historic 
preservation ordinances.115  In First Covenant, the Supreme Court of Washington 
created a religious exemption when it held that a Seattle historic preservation 
ordinance was invalid under both the federal constitution and the Washington 
                                                 
114 See Lee at 593. 
115 See First Covenant, 840 P.2d 174. 
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Constitution, despite the ordinance including a liturgy exception.116  The court 
held that the ordinance was not valid as a neutral, generally applicable law under 
Smith.  The court first held that the Seattle ordinance was an invalid burden on 
free exercise rights because it referred to religious facilities specifically within the 
ordinance and thus was not neutral.117  The court also found that the ordinance 
was not generally applicable because it invited individualized assessments of the 
property and its use.118  Finally, the court found that the ordinance fit within 
Smith’s “hybrid situation” exception.  The ordinance violated both the church’s 
free exercise of religion and their free speech right.119  Thus, the court applied the 
Sherbert compelling state interest test to the Seattle ordinance and found that the 
ordinance was invalid.120  To prevent a review of the decision by the Supreme 
Court, the court also invalidated the ordinance under the Washington 
Constitution.121  Because the First Covenant court rejected an historic 
preservation ordinance that included a liturgy exemption as applied to religious 
property, it is likely that the court will mandate a religious exemption for any 
historic preservation ordinance developed. 
Like AB 133, the exemption created in First Covenant has a valid secular 
purpose and thus satisfies the first prong of the Lemon analysis.  The court’s 
reasoning in First Covenant demonstrates that the religious exemption was carved 
out because, in including religious organizations within the scope of those 
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119 Id. at 216. 
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regulated by historic preservation requirements, the court believed that Seattle’s 
ordinance violated free exercise rights under both the federal and Washington 
constitutions.122  It is not required that an exemption is necessary to prevent a 
violation of a religious organization’s free exercise rights for accommodation to 
be a secular purpose.123 Therefore, even if the court’s analysis is wrong, as I 
believe it to be, and the application of Seattle’s historic preservation ordinance to 
religious institutions is not a violation of their free exercise rights, preventing any 
infringement on their religious exercise is still a valid secular purpose. 
Washington’s judicially created exemption does not fair so well under the 
second part of the Lemon analysis.  The exemption has the primary effect of 
advancing religion.  Similar to California’s exemption and the tax exemption 
struck down in Texas Monthly, Washington’s exemption also applies only to 
religious properties.124  By allowing religious property owners to use their 
property in more economically beneficial ways than can their nonreligious 
neighbors, Washington’s exemption advances religion.  As noted above, 
exempting only properties owned by religious institutions from historic 
preservation ordinances gives religious institutions a distinct financial advantage 
over nonreligious property owners, thus causing the same type of subsidy that was 
found unconstitutional in Texas Monthly.   
Washington’s exemption also fails the excessive entanglement prong of 
the Lemon test. The exemption delegates governmental power to religious 
instituions.  In First Covenant, the court found that the liturgy exemption allowed 
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the city to control aspects of religious exercise by regulating religious 
properties.125  The court’s unwillingness to allow the government to determine if 
a religious institution qualifies for a liturgy exemption essentially allows religious 
institutions to declare themselves qualified.  This is what Larkin forbids.  The 
court is “substitut[ing] the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the 
reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body.”126  Perhaps, as the First 
Covenant court was so concerned, allowing government to determine if churches 
qualify for a liturgy exemption may lead to some form of entanglement.  But, as 
we saw above, the cursory examination that would tell the city if a requested 
alteration or demolition involves religious exercise is no more excessive than 
exploring the financial affairs of religious institutions.  Such government 
intrusions have been upheld.127       
Washington’s exemption also fails to satisfy Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test.  Like AB 133, the exemption is likely to be seen by a 
reasonable observer as endorsing religion because the observer will not see the 
need for accommodation because the regulation of buildings does not interfere 
with a constitutional right.  
Fitting Washington’s religious exemption into the confines of the coercion 
test is just as difficult as fitting AB 133 into the analysis.  Therefore, it is unlikely 
that this test would be used to determine if the exemption is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  If the test was used, it might be satisfied because 
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providing financial incentives to religious institutions may be seen as a coercion 
to nonreligious institutions to become religiously affiliated. 
C.  The Massachussetts Exemption 
Massachussetts also provides for religious exemptions to land use regulation.  The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts created a religious exemption to interior 
designations in Society of Jesus.128  In that case, the court held that an ordinance 
designating the interior of a church as a landmark violated the religious institutions free 
exercise rights as guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights of the Massachussetts 
Constitution.129  Massachussetts also statutorily exempts religious institutions from 
zoning ordinances.130  Although the text of the statute could be seen as covering historic 
preservation ordinances as well, no court has so held. 
Despite some similarity to the California and Washington exemptions, 
Massachusetts’ judicially created religious exemption from interior designations of 
historic property is not an Establishment Clause violation under any of the tests.  
Religious exemptions for interior designations are required under the Free Exercise 
Clause.  The interior arrangement of a church is intertwined with religious exercise.  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized this in Society of Jesus.  The court 
found that the interior design of a church “is so freighted with religious meaning that it 
must be considered part and parcel of the Jesuits’ religious worship.”131     At issue in 
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130 The statute provides that no zoning ordinance shall “prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or 
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Society of Jesus was alteration to the altar.132  It is hard to imagine a part of a religious 
structure more central to religious exercise than its altar.   
Even if religious exemptions to interior designations were unnecessary, they 
would still not be an establishment of religion under any of the Establishment Clause 
tests.  Just as the California and Washington exemptions have a secular purpose, so does 
the Massachusetts exemption; it has the purpose of preventing governmental intrusion 
into religious exercise.  The exemption from interior designations, however, does not 
have the primary effect of advancing religion.  It would not give religious institutions an 
advantage over nonreligious property owners.  They may affect the use slightly if a major 
interior renovation is desired, but is much less likely to affect the use of property than an 
exterior designation.  A stronger case is also made that interior designations would cause 
excessive entanglement, thus, exemptions reduce entanglement rather than increase it.  
Because interior space is more closely related to religious exercise, there is more of a 
danger that determining if an alteration should be allowed would excessively entangle 
government with religious exercise.  Thus, interior designations would more closely 
resemble the concerns of the Supreme Court in Amos that the government should not be 
involved in decisions so central to religious exercise.   
The religious exemption from interior designation would also pass muster under 
the endorsement test.  Unlike blanket exemptions from historic preservation ordinances, 
religious exemptions from interior landmark designations will be seen by an objective 
observer as necessary to protect free exercise.  An objective observer would understand 
that the interior spaces of a religious building are important aspects of the religion itself, 
and would thus not see allowing religious institutions to do as they wish with their 
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interior space as an endorsement of religion.  Rather, the observer would see that the 
exemption is a necessary accommodation. 
Religious exemptions from interior landmark designations would also be found to 
be constitutional using the coercion test.  Because interior designations do not confer an 
economic benefit on religious institutions at the expense of nonreligious property owners, 
there is no governmental pressure into religious practice; nor is there reason for 
nonreligious property owners to feel forced to sell to religious institutions to receive full 
value for their property.   
IV.  Conclusion and Recommendation 
 Because there is an inherent conflict between free exercise and historic 
preservation, even if it often does not rise to the level of an impermissible burden on free 
exercise, it may be desirable for some jurisdictions to exempt religious properties from 
historic preservation ordinances.  If a jurisdiction does desire to create a religious 
exemption from a generally applicable historic preservation ordinance, the cases that 
have decided these issues suggest that such exemptions should be limited.  If possible, 
only interior spaces should be exempted because these spaces are often of great 
importance in religious exercise.  If a jurisdiction determines that it must make exterior 
religious exemptions as well, those exemptions should apply to a broader group of 
organizations than simply religious organizations.  For example, the exemptions should 
include other non-profit organizations, using the tax exemption in Walz as a model.  
Religion-only exemptions might never be considered constitutional.  However, to make 
the best possible case for constitutionality, a religion-only exemption should be narrowly 
tailored to only apply in situations where free exercise is actually burdened and it should 
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also apply only to houses of worship, not to other property owned by religious 
institutions.133  If these guidelines are followed, religious exemptions to historic 
preservation ordinances may be permissible accommodations of religion. 
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